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eral times each year. Fourteen states 12 have authorized suits by
a general law, when the terms of the statute are fully complied
with and when the plaintiff is included in one of the classes set
out in the statute. In some states13 administrative tribunals hear
claims against the state.
The Jefferson Lake Sulphur case decision seems to be in
keeping with the modem trend of gradually stripping a state of
its immunity from suit.
WILLIAM

E. SKYE
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holder in Union Construction Company, Incorporated, as well as
shareholder and director of Riverside Realty Company, Incorporated, sued to compel the latter company to allow him to inspect its books and records. Defendant resisted contending that
plaintiff was a stockholder in a competing business and owned
less than the twenty-five per cent of the stock of defendant corporation required by the Business Corporations Act' before inspection can be compelled. Held, ". . . the objects and purposes
of the respondent corporation [Riverside Realty] and the Union
Construction Co., Inc. are of such scope that either. . . could engage in several types of business. Hence ... parol evidence was
properly admitted to determine whether Union . . .and the respondent
'.are business competitors and . . . this evidence reveals that they are not."'2 Pittman v. Riverside Realty Company,
Incorporated,36 So. (2d) 642 (La. 1948).
The requirement of ownership of a certain percentage of
stock as a prerequisite to the inspection of corporate books is a
recent innovation to corporation law.3 The general rule as developed at common law afforded a right of inspection limited only
by the requirement that such inspection be made at a reasonable
12. Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana (contract claims only), Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Virginia (pecuniary claims only), Washington, Wisconsin.

13. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah.
1. La. Act 250 of 1928, as last amended by La. Act 34 of 1935 (4 E.S.)
[Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 1080 et seq.]. For a discussion of this act in Its

entirety, see Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928 (1940)
2 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 644.
2. Pittman v. Riverside Realty Co., Inc., 36 So.(2d) 642, 644 (La. 1948).
3. Although our act is patterned after the Model Business Corporations
Act, this provision is entirely new. Of the three other states (Idaho, Washington and Kentucky) following the Model Act, none have a similar provision. Two states (New York and Illinois) require either a holding of stock
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time for a proper purpose. 4 The need for this right of inspection
is apparent. Louisiana's constitutions have recognized a right of
inspection since 1879.- If no such right existed, a stockholder
could conceivably know nothing about the corporation's affairs,
and his right to vote his stock would become almost valueless.
With the corporate form of business being utilized to an enormous extent, and the corresponding increase in the number of
people holding shares of stock in two or more corporations,
coupled with the practice of including a multitude of purposes
in the charters of these corporations, it is clear that a strict interpretation of the statutory provision under discussion could lead
to great hardship.
However, in the instant case, the court, in interpreting this
clause, very properly took notice of the fact that the objects and
purposes of the business as outlined in the charters of most corporations cover a broad field to enable the company to engage in
various enterprises if time and circumstances make it desirable or
necessary, and allowed parol evidence to disclose whether the
two corporations were actually engaged in any competitive activities. This ruling should go far toward making the twenty-five
per cent requirement more workable than might have been possible had the court seen fit to adhere to a strict interpretation.
Following this decision, the actual business activity of the corporations will determine whether they are competitors within the
meaning of Section 38.6
It is still very possible that some well-meaning shareholder
owning a few shares of stock in a competitive corporation may
desire to inspect the books. Such shareholder would not have
the requisite twenty-five per cent of stock, but he might invoke
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Louisiana Constitution which provides for public inspection of certain corporate books-namely,
books showing the amount of capital stock subscribed, the names
of owners of stock, the amount owned by them respectively, the
amount of stock paid, and by whom, the transfers of stock with
the date of transfer, the amount of the corporation's assets and
liabilities, and the names and places of residence of its officers.
-Insofar as inspection of these books is concerned, it would seem
for six months or ownership of five per cent of all stock before inspection
may be made by any stockholder.
4. Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 26 S.Ct. 4, 50 L.Ed. 130 (1905).
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIII, § 4; La. Const. (1879) Art. 245; La. Const.
(1898) Art. 273; La. Const. (1913) Art. 273.

6. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 38 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1118].
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that the percentage requirements of Section 38 would be void.
Of course, the constitutional right of inspection does not embrace
the examination of books showing the action taken at shareholders' and directors' meetings, statements of receipts and disbursements, gains and losses, and other similar facts-the inspection of
which is essential before a thorough picture of the corporation's
activity may be had. In order to have a right to inspect these
books, the shareholder must meet the strict, and somewhat impractical, requirements of Section 38. In this regard the liberal
interpretation of the instant case achieves a fortunate and logical
result.
ROBERT

L.

ROLAND,

III

DONATIONS-TACIT REVOCATIONS OF DONATIONS INTER VIVOS-

An individual created a charitable trust to which he donated
several hundred lots. Subsequently the donor and donee trustee
agreed to sell to the defendant certain land, including the lots
previously donated. The donor joined with the donee in signing
the warranty deed tendered to the defendant, but the defendant
refused to accept the deed. Suit for specific performance followed. The defendant resisted upon the ground that the title
was not merchantable since the property was open to an action
of revendication by the forced heirs of the donor.' Held, that the
donor's joining with the donee in the signing of the warranty
deed resulted in a tacit revocation of the donation and furnished
a valid title which would not be subject to an action of revendication by the forced heirs of the donor. Atkins v. Johnston, 213
La. 458, 35 So.(2d) 16 (1948), Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice
McCaleb dissenting.
The Civil Code treats a donation inter vivos as a solemn contract perfected by the formal acceptance of the donee and irrevocable2 by the donor except for causes specified in the code. 3
1. The right of revendication is granted by Art. 1517, La. Civil Code of
1870, which provides, "The action of reduction or revendication may be
brought by the heirs against third persons holding the immovable property,

which has been alienated by the donee, in the same manner and order that
it may be brought against the donee himself, but after discussion of the
property of the donee."

Accord: Tessier v. Roussel, 41 La. Ann. 474, 6 So. 542 (1889), in which
the court recognized the right of the forced heirs to bring an action against
third persons holding immovable property that has been the subject of a

donation in excess of the disposable portion.
2. Art. 1468, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A donation inter aivos (between
living persons) is an act by which the donor divests himself, at present and
irrevocably, of the thing given, in favor of the donee who accepts it." (Italics

supplied.)
3. Art. 1559, La. Civil Code of 1870.

